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In this contribution to Text Matters, I would like to introduce gender into 
my feminist response to Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of 
the capable subject. The aim is to make, phenomenologically speaking, 
“visible” the gendering of this subject in a hermeneutic problematic: that 
of a subject’s loss of confidence in her own ability to understand herself. 
Ricoeurian hermeneutics enables us to elucidate the generally hidden di-
mensions in a phenomenology of lost self-confidence; Ricoeur describes 
capability as “originally given” to each lived body; but then, something 
has happened, gone wrong or been concealed in one’s loss of confidence. 
Ricoeur himself does not ask how the gender or sex of one’s own body 
affects this loss. So I draw on contemporary feminist debates about the 
phenomenology of the body, as well as Julia Kristeva’s hermeneutics of 
the Antigone figure, in order to demonstrate how women might recon-
figure the epistemic limits of human capability, revealing themselves as 
“a horizon” of the political order, for better or worse.
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T
“You are divided, torn—I would say cleft—between 
the logic of the political and that of your own blood, 
but only if it is the blood of 
 an instigator of transgressions” 
(Kristeva 216)
IntroductIon
This essay will focus on a subject’s loss of confidence in her own ability 
to understand herself. The aim is to make, phenomenologically speaking, 
visible the gendering of subjects in at least one strand of post-Kantian phi-
losophy, that is, in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of the capable 
subject. In one sense, my focus here derives from Alan Montefiore’s “In-
troduction” to Philosophy in France Today, where Montefiore reflects on 
a philosophical culture in transition. That was philosophical culture thirty 
years ago. Yet today we still face that philosophical issue “bound up with 
the subject’s loss of self-confidence in its own ability to understand itself, 
and indeed, in its own intrinsic significance” (xi). In another sense, my 
focus derives from Ricoeur’s own chapter from thirty-one years ago, “On 
Interpretation,” also in Philosophy in France Today. At that time, Ricoeur 
interprets his self-identity as a philosopher by elucidating the path of his 
published texts to “hermeneutic phenomenology” (187). In 2014 we can 
see in retrospect, how in 1983 Ricoeur himself anticipated his later philo-
sophical account of “the capable subject.”1
To the above philosophical thinking, I  would like to introduce the 
generally hidden dimensions of gender in the loss of (philosophical) self-
confidence presented by Montefiore and in the discovery of human ca-
pability made by Ricoeur. Inserting gender specific pronouns helps to 
indicate my present concern with “gendering.”2 So, my focus includes gen-
dering the “subject’s loss of confidence in her own ability to understand 
herself ” (cf. Introduction xi). I will elucidate feminist understandings of 
the subject: those that emerge in the decades of transition, 1983–2014, 
in French and Anglo-American philosophy. My contention is that during 
these three decades women in philosophy have actively sought to restore 
a  woman’s confidence in her own ability to understand herself, philo-
sophically, personally and socially. The stress here is on “restore.” This 
1 On the capable subject, see Ricoeur, The Just 2–7; The Course of Recognition 89–149.
2 Here “gendering” means the generally hidden process of determining the qualitative 
(as distinct from the numerical) identities of women and men.
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restoration assumes that a  woman is similar to a  man insofar as she is, 
in strongly phenomenological terms, originally a capable subject. Human 
capability is, then, originally given to each lived body, what Ricoeur calls 
le corps propre (one’s own body). To this phenomenological assumption 
is added a  Ricoeurian hermeneutics that attempts to interpret what has 
happened, gone wrong, or has been concealed, in the loss of confidence in 
one’s own capability.
Ricoeur himself gives an account of l’homme capable (the capable 
 [hu]man): but this raises questions concerning the gender-inclusivity 
and/or gender-neutrality of the body of that capable subject for the con-
temporary feminist reader. Is human capability gender neutral? If so, 
how does one’s own sexed/gendered body affect one’s capability? Has 
the gender/sex of the phenomenological conception of one’s own body 
been exclusively masculine and/or male? Here I will maintain that even 
if l’homme in the sense of the generic “man” is meant to be gender inclu-
sive, the impact of this conception on Ricoeur’s legacy is struggling to 
locate the role of gender in hermeneutic phenomenology. Admittedly, 
only an implicit and pernicious gender bias would ignore woman as a ca-
pable subject who, similar to any capable man, can have confidence in 
her own ability to understand herself philosophically. Nevertheless, it 
remains necessary to stress that the capable subject’s self-understanding 
must consider its lived body as socially and materially located: and this 
includes its gendered locatedness (Anderson, Re-visioning Gender 205). 
I  will contend that this is necessary, even if we would like to assume, 
perhaps with Ricoeur, that our bodies are equivalent to each other in the 
fundamental sense of each being originally capable.
In 1980 when I first began reading and talking to Ricoeur, I attempted 
to understand two necessarily interrelated aspects making up what I came 
to identify as Ricoeur’s Kantian dual-aspect subject of action; these were 
the interrelated aspects of practical reason and natural inclination in hu-
man freedom (Anderson, “The Subject’s Loss of Self-Confidence” 87–93). 
At the time, I argued that the two aspects of Kantian rationality and sen-
sibility together constituted the two moments of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Ricoeur and Kant 41–59). More than thirty years later, 
in this retrospective reading of Ricoeur’s “On Interpretation,” I have been 
surprised to find—I seemed to have forgotten—that in 1983 Ricoeur also 
mentioned the loss of self-unity which, in Montefiore’s words, “all Kant’s 
transcendental horses and king’s men” would not exactly be able to put 
back together again (xii). 
In 2014, when we consider philosophy in Britain, France and the rest of 
Europe, especially if we consider the female subject’s ability to understand 
herself, it is clear that the philosophical subject continues to struggle with 
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various dimensions of dis-unity. However, I no longer see the Kantian ten-
sions which Ricoeur identifies between freedom and nature as the most dif-
ficult challenge, if they ever were, to a philosopher’s self-unity. The ongoing 
dis-unity of the self involves cultural, as well as cognitive, conative and affec-
tive factors. It is not just that the self ’s unity has been broken up, but that 
something highly significant has been lost. This is something that, as I am 
contending, we do not mourn. Instead we can and need to retrieve what has 
been lost from our social and interpersonal awareness. Contemporary femi-
nist philosophers at least have come to recognize that women and men have 
materially and socially specific differences due to gender’s intersectionality 
(cf. Crenshaw, On Intersectionality). Yet the unique singularity of personal 
identity has been lost from our vision, or obscured by a preoccupation with 
the concrete differences of our lived bodily experiences. So, in the twenty-
first century I have tried to demonstrate that gendering has become increas-
ingly significant as a philosophical issue, not only for my feminist reading 
of Ricoeur’s text, but for philosophy in the past three decades of social and 
cultural transition in Europe and the Anglo-American world. 
We can discover gendering as the generally hidden process of deter-
mining the qualitative as distinct from the numerical identities of bodies in 
a culture: we discover these qualitative identities of bodies in terms of cul-
turally recognized “sex.” Here it must be stressed that this hidden process 
of gendering in the West at least has been highly problematic, especially 
insofar as philosophical texts construct gender in relation to a binary of 
sex. This process of gendering becomes the critical focus of the present 
hermeneutics of philosophical and literary texts. And this hermeneutics 
aims to extend what I began in Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Reli-
gion: Reason, Love and Epistemic Locatedness: that is, we should continue 
“to look back with open eyes” and “from a critical distance,” in order to 
interpret the gendering of human identities by the moral and religious di-
mensions of philosophical and literary texts (ix, 1, 49, 89–94). Gender has 
very definitely, even if unwittingly, shaped the philosopher’s self-under-
standing, especially her or his understanding of human emotion, reason 
and cognition.
Gender In PhIlosoPhy: A Problem for self-understAndInG
Although Montefiore’s “Introduction” does not make this explicit, 
Ricoeur’s “On Interpretation” is grouped with those other chapters in 
Philosophy in France Today that address the subject’s loss of confidence 
in its own ability to understand itself. Montefiore adds that this is also 
a loss of self-confidence in “[the self ’s] own intrinsic significance” (xi) as 
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a subject of knowledge and action. In “On Interpretation” Ricoeur situ-
ates himself within a  French tradition of “reflexive philosophy”: he ex-
plains that being reflexive means being subject-oriented in a movement of 
looking back on oneself (187–88). So the philosophical subject as an agent 
is literally reflexive in its act of turning back upon itself. Adding gender to 
this account, we discover that the philosophical subject also has the ability 
to reflect, socially and materially, upon the qualitative identity of herself 
and of her actions. Nevertheless, reflexivity does not necessarily ensure 
self-understanding in philosophy.
Basically, reflexive philosophers in France, but equally other philoso-
phers both on and off the Continent, came to be preoccupied in the second 
half of the twentieth century with the subject’s own loss of self-under-
standing. For his part, Ricoeur would have assumed that this loss is related 
to a lack of what he nevertheless thought to be necessary: self-reflexivity. 
Most relevant for reflexive philosophy was the fact that the philosophical 
ideas and issues of the rational subject extended from a Cartesian to a neo-
Kantian philosophical tradition of self-reflection. As an active part of this 
long rationalist tradition, Ricoeur in particular singles out the reflexivity 
by which the subject seeks to understand itself in relation to its own (in-
ternal) alterity. But it is worth noting that, unlike the French philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas or feminist psycholinguist Luce Irigaray, Ricoeur never 
takes the self ’s alterity to include sexually specific female figures.
The closest Ricoeur comes to giving an account of a female figure of 
alterity is an interesting exception in Oneself as Another. This book con-
tains Ricoeur’s Gifford Lectures, which he revised to include an “Inter-
lude” where he discusses the tragic figure of Antigone (241–49, 256).3 Pre-
viously I have placed Ricoeur’s configuration of Antigone alongside other 
configurations in texts written by G. W. F. Hegel, George Steiner, Martha 
Nussbaum and Irigaray. What is noteworthy about Ricoeur’s configura-
tion is his reliance on Hegel’s remarkable reading of Antigone as “the eter-
nal irony of the community” (Hegel 288).4 Ricoeur singles out Antigone’s 
act from the role of her sister, Ismene, and from her own potential role as 
a wife and mother; this singularity suffices to mark Antigone out as an ex-
ception to her gender. So, for Ricoeur, she does not in any straightforward 
sense represent feminine alterity. Instead, Antigone is above all a  tragic 
figure; her “one-sidedness” in the face of “the complexity of life” leads 
inevitably to her death (Oneself as Another 249).
3 For an earlier discussion of Antigone in Oneself as Another, see Anderson, “Re-
reading Myth in Philosophy” 51–68.
4 For an earlier discussion of Hegel’s reading of Antigone and Ricoeur’s relation to 
it, see Anderson, “Re-reading Myth in Philosophy” 55–59.
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My point here is that Ricoeur does not configure an essential feminin-
ity, or any other normative figure of female alterity, in Oneself as Another. 
His concern is neither gender nor sexual difference. In sharp contrast, Iri-
garay mimes Antigone as a  sexually ambiguous figure who can be read 
to play either a masculine or a feminine role. In her disruptive mimesis, 
Irigaray deliberately configures Antigone, as if multiply gendered, in order 
to explore the sexual difference between two sexually specific subjects. 
It, then, seems that Ricoeur has not kept up with feminist texts insofar 
as he simply configures the philosophical subject, including Antigone, 
as gender-neutral. As a figure of fragility and death, Antigone serves as 
Ricoeur’s tragic figure for familial and political life; and as such, Antigone 
does not represent a loss of self-confidence either in the ability to under-
stand herself or in her own intrinsic significance. Yet I insist that even if 
configured as one-sided, Ricoeur’s Antigone reveals her own capability 
and confidence. Nevertheless, his (re)configuring of Antigone as atypi-
cal—as torn between masculine and feminine roles—links Ricoeur with 
a long Hegelian tradition in finding her “an eternal irony of the commu-
nity” (Hegel 288).
Today Julia Kristeva can help us to reread both Hegel and Ricoeur on 
Antigone for better understanding of how the subject is gendered. In Kris-
teva’s dialogue with Catherine Clément, in The Feminine and the Sacred, 
she claims that it is 
That sense of strangeness that confers on certain women the appear-
ance of a disabused and benevolent maturity, a serene detachment that, 
it seems to me, is the true sense of [what] Hegel so enigmatically calls 
“the eternal irony of the community.” In fact, women do not remain on 
the near side of phallic power, but they accede to it only to better learn 
their way around its omnipotence. That detachment . . . stems from our 
immersion in Being and sensible timelessness. (60)
Is Kristeva proposing that this “immersion in Being” gives women the pos-
sibility for greater confidence (than men) in their own capability? 
In a more recent collection, Feminist Readings of Antigone, Kristeva 
develops several new and highly nuanced points concerning this same fig-
ure who is “cleft” between the logic of the political and of her own blood. 
I propose that Kristeva makes points which are relevant for re-visioning 
gender. In her eighth (out of nine) interpretative point concerning Anti-
gone, Kristeva suggests
Far from being a relic of the past, the universality of Antigone resonates 
in the psychic life of women today. . . . The emancipation of the “second 
sex,” and the intermingling of diverse religious and cultural traditions 
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(as Judith Butler discusses in Antigone’s Claim)—the anthropologically 
universal dimension of feminine solitude confronted with the drive of 
de-binding (déliaison) still makes itself evident today in clinical observa-
tion, as well as in social behaviour. Solitude and de-binding (déliaison), 
neither necessarily reject motherhood, but rather demand and accom-
pany it. . . . This cannot make us forget, however, the emerging strength 
of those women who have the opportunity and the capacity to generate 
a new understanding, skill, or even a way of life or survival out of it: 
a remarkable consequence of the emancipation of women that is still in 
process. (“Antigone: Limit and Horizon” 226)
Now it is helpful to recognize that in Oneself as Another the philosophical 
subject which had reigned supreme within a certain French Cartesian tradi-
tion suffers a decisive blow from twentieth-century philosophy. That sub-
ject loses confidence in its own self-certainty. In Ricoeur’s terms, the “shat-
tered cogito” (cogito brisé) refers to a serious and, for some philosophers, 
decisive blow to the Cartesian confidence: the “I think” is no longer an 
indubitable of modern philosophy. In other words, late twentieth-century 
philosophical critiques of Cartesian certainty have left an indelible mark 
on the French philosophical legacy. In fact, thirty years ago, I myself was 
directly concerned with the upshot for a  Kantian tradition in France of 
a  renewed attack on the cogito’s self-certainty; and one response to this 
attack was to assert the pre-reflexive cogito of French existentialism (cf. 
Howie 136–40, 162). Similarly, in 1980s Oxford, it was popular for Anglo-
American philosophers to talk about the problem of the self. Gradually 
the philosophical problem of numerical and/or qualitative identity became 
a common concern of philosophers globally. The question of personal iden-
tity continues to have a universal remit. 
Ricoeur’s own contribution to this question is apparent in his sali-
ent distinction between numerical sameness over time (in Ricoeur’s terms, 
idem) and qualitative identity (ipseity) (Oneself as Another 16–18). To-
day the problem of personal identity remains a popular topic of debate 
for philosophers on both sides of the English Channel. Yet a distinctive 
characteristic of selfhood in France continues to be ipseity. Crucially for 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology, ipseity-identity rather than same-
ness-identity, enables a reflexive self-sameness; and this generates the pos-
sibility of self-understanding (The Course of Recognition 101–04).
I am not sure how common it would have been in the 1980s or how 
common it is in 2014 to respond to philosophical scepticism concern-
ing gender by exposing loss of confidence in the subject’s ability to un-
derstand herself. Nevertheless, if there is anything therapeutic in study-
ing post-Kantian philosophy—that is, in the upshot of Kant’s legacy as 
seen in the problems of the self—it is the possibility of responding to the 
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philosophical problem of selfhood with the tools of French hermeneutic 
phenomenology. This means that, if following the late Ricoeur, we can 
interpret the lived body as capable. So, a distinctive response of hermeneu-
tic phenomenology can restore the self ’s capability in an ongoing critical 
process.
It is important to notice that Ricoeur’s phenomenology begins by rec-
ognizing the Kantian limit to self-knowledge; next, Ricoeur responds to 
this Kantian limit by proposing an indirect route, by way of hermeneutics, 
to self-understanding. With this hermeneutic phenomenology, Ricoeur 
leads his readers indirectly to the self: he interprets the “signs, symbols and 
texts” which have been left as the remains of a philosophical culture.5 For 
example, we already mentioned texts which configure Antigone as a self 
who is divided against herself. Now, we may also like to recall the ancient 
text of Genesis, part of which has been reconfigured using “signs” (e.g., 
the defilement) and “symbols” (e.g., the fall) to represent Eve’s seduction 
of Adam. In fact, (re)configurations of a woman’s qualitative identity by 
patriarchal cultures have shattered the female subject’s self-understanding 
as originally innocent. Patriarchal configurations of Eve’s sinful act—like 
those of Antigone—have the power to undermine la femme capable. In this 
way, the subject loses confidence in her own ability to understand herself.
This section has tried to demonstrate that significant changes in the 
culture and content of French philosophy have taken place since the mo-
ment when, in 1980s Oxford, Montefiore edited his collection of essays, 
including Ricoeur’s “On Interpretation.” Montefiore aimed to bridge the 
gap between the UK’s island of philosophy and the land of understand-
ing on the Continent.6 I have dedicated myself to uncovering a process of 
gendering in modern philosophy on both sides of the English Channel. 
This recovery is itself an ongoing process. It remains rare to find attempts 
to expose the mechanisms of gender oppression in philosophical texts. Yet 
these texts offer evidence of confidence being lost in the ability to achieve 
self-understanding in contemporary philosophy.
5 Increasingly, on and off the Continent modern philosophy is a part of a culture 
in transition. This is already evident in philosophical issues like those of the split Kantian 
subject; of Kantian autonomy and vulnerability; of epistemic injustice and ethical 
confidence, of gender identity and its intersectional relations to religion, race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation and so on. In other words, contemporary approaches to the modern 
philosopher’s own self-definition reflect the significance of the recent history of, as relevant 
here, French and British philosophies.
6 To see this change, we only need to consider the evidence that, since Ricoeur’s 
own death in 2005, his legacy has already resulted in a new foundation being set up in Paris, 
Fonds Ricoeur, along with new societies in the USA and in the UK for the study of Ricoeur, 
generating an international series of new books, a new international, bilingual journal, and 
a significantly wide range of international conferences.
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Gender and the Lived Body: towards a PhenomenoLoGy  
of confIdence 
In 2010 I  turned to phenomenology in order to elucidate loss of confi-
dence as a social phenomenon and an ethical relation. As a social phenom-
enon, confidence has been undermined by the imposition of a fixed gender 
type. As an ethical relation, confidence between two gendered subjects 
has been damaged by epistemic injustice. In “The Lived Body, Gender and 
Confidence,” I elucidate the story of Eve as the first woman who suffers 
a loss of confidence in her own intrinsic significance. Eve is portrayed in 
texts of ancient culture and in ongoing religious traditions. We can read 
the texts of Western culture as they capture the philosophical imaginary in 
portraits of a woman (Eve) in the process of becoming aware of her body 
physically and cognitively. At the very same moment in the Genesis nar-
rative, when this female figure glimpses her own capability7 she becomes 
simultaneously conscious of losing confidence in her own body and in her 
cognitive ability.8 
My own reconfiguring of the text, especially of the ancient myth in 
Genesis, which has been read to configure Eve’s desire as excessive and 
her act sinful, in order to support patriarchy, follows the narrative con-
cerning the “first” woman phenomenologically. Unlike a historical con-
figuration of a particular woman, a phenomenological reconfiguration of 
Eve—as a  generic figure of women—can narrate her loss of confidence 
to capture the lived experience of women generally in their original rela-
tion to men. In reading the narrative phenomenologically we can find that 
Eve’s desire for knowledge of good and evil leads her not only to disobey 
a divine command, but to seduce the “first” man (Adam). In this narra-
tion, a clear difference appears between Eve and Adam. In other words, 
7 Note that my account of capability derives from a range of Ricoeur’s later writings. 
More work could still be done on exactly how to define this idea of capability. Is it pre-
personal in Merleau-Ponty’s sense? Capability might be both metaphysical and ethical 
in Ricoeur, especially since informed by Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Spinoza’s Ethics; yet 
Ricoeur himself clearly appeals to “the phenomenological point of view” to describe the 
multiple expressions of the capacities of “the ‘I can’” (“Autonomy and Vulnerability” 
75). Hermeneutic phenomenology enables Ricoeur to describe “selfhood” and the “I” 
through “the mode of different abilities”; this includes, “I can speak, can narrate, can act” 
(“Autonomy and Vulnerability” 76; cf. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another 10–23, 298–317).
8 These points are supported by the depiction of Eve about which Le Doeuff (The Sex 
of Knowing 67–68) and Hersch (“Eve ou la Naissance éternelle du Temps” 27) speak. This 
depiction comes from the twelfth-century sculptor Gislebert (also known as Gislebertus) 
whose depiction of the temptation of Eve appears a linteau constructed above the north 
door on the early twelfth-century cathedral at St-Lazare in Autun, France. However, this 
sculpted depiction of Eve is no longer part of the cathedral; it is in the Musée Rolin in 
Autun.
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this reconfiguration of the Genesis text supports differentiation by gender. 
Gendering the lived body (of Eve) becomes a process which moves from 
pre-personal capability to personal awareness of moral values. 
In addition, although traditionally the patriarchal gendering of the 
same text had portrayed man (Adam) passively as seduced by woman 
(Eve), a feminist phenomenological reconfiguration would seek to subvert 
the configuration of the female protagonist’s action as setting in motion 
“the fall” from an original condition of innocent capability. Instead the 
feminist reconfiguration of Adam and Eve can demonstrate that the spe-
cifically gendered loss of confidence in the power to act and to know under 
patriarchy left woman doubly disadvantaged by human desire: not only 
was she wrong to follow her desire for her own moral knowledge by ignor-
ing God’s moral command, but she led man to follow her in turning away 
from the good. This gendering assigns a greater moral guilt to woman than 
man. And yet, the proposed feminist reconfiguration of this myth turns 
on the fact that both of these gendered subjects remain capable. Thus, as-
signing different degrees of evil to one or another of the heterosexually 
gendered pairs does not lessen human capability: capability remains a hu-
man possibility precisely because it is an original power of human action, 
however the subject is gendered.
Returning to my phenomenological reconfiguration, we can see how 
Eve becomes aware of, as in the phenomenological terms of Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty, “the embodied modalities of her existence” when she is thrown 
open into a “mortal situation of listening” (Merleau-Ponty 158–70).9 Be-
coming attuned to her situation, the woman’s self-discovery involves both 
surprise and terror. Crucially, in moving from pre-personal to personal 
awareness, Eve remains incarnate; that is, she retains her bodily awareness, 
movement and entanglement in intersubjective, fleshy existence. At the 
moment when the gendered subject emerges out of pre-personal existence, 
she is aware of her own lived through body (Anderson, “The Lived Body” 
163–64, 178–79). 
Contemporary feminist accounts of the subject and her body have crit-
icized Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and, more generally, 
the phenomenologist’s conception of “the lived body” as the medium of 
all perception. For example, Judith Butler contends that Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception presupposes heterosexuality and traditional 
male-gender norms for the body (“Sexual Ideology” 85–100). According 
9 Merleau-Ponty does not state this about Eve. Instead I employ his phenomenological 
terms to describe the however implicit, dominant configuration of Eve as her story unfolds 
from an originally given account of human capability to the apparent “loss” of what was 
originally hers. 
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to Butler, the lived body tends to be confused with a “naturalized” body; 
and the latter is, in any case, always already an interpreted body. For an-
other example of a feminist reading of Merleau-Ponty, Michèle Le Doeuff 
accuses the Phenomenology of Perception of objectifying the female body:
Merleau-Ponty says that for a normal subject, the body of another per-
son is not perceived as an object. The perception that might have been 
objective is in fact inhabited by another, more secret, perception, which, 
he says, accentuates the erogenous zones of the visible body of the other 
according to a sexual schema peculiar to the perceiving subject so that 
this body will call forth “the gestures of the masculine body.” He was 
speaking of the visible body in general, perceived by a normal subject; 
however, it becomes clear that this visible body is a woman’s body, seen 
and redrawn by the gaze of a man, who before long will move unhesitat-
ingly from gaze to gesture! Not only is the subject necessarily male, the 
visible body necessarily that of a woman, but also the gaze (of a man 
directed at a  woman) can remake what it sees, to accentuate what he 
finds erogenous. A form of visual violence is normalized here in all its 
generality. On principle and as a general procedure, the (masculine) gaze 
re-creates the visible body of a (feminine) other precisely as it wishes. 
(The Sex of Knowing 79; cf. Phenomenology of Perception 180–81)
In Giving an Account of Oneself Butler discusses Michel Foucault’s critique 
of “the trans-historical subject” in phenomenology (115–17). Can there 
be such a subject? Clearly for existential phenomenologists like Simone 
de Beauvoir the subject is always embodied and situated in a world, tran-
scending history. And yet, at the time when Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur 
developed their respective phenomenological accounts of one’s own body 
(le corps propre) in Paris, even though they had read Beauvoir’s phenom-
enology in The Second Sex,10 their descriptions seem to assume a  male-
neutral body as, quite possibly, a trans-historical subject. In particular, they 
attempted no explicitly gendered description of Eve and her gradual awak-
ening to the pre-personal capability to which her body will in some sense 
cleave, but from which she will in another sense be separated by the criti-
cal process of gendering the male as “subject” and the female as “abject” 
(Anderson, “Abjection and Defilement”). The dual sense of the body both 
cleaving to and separating from pre-personal form creates an ambiguous 
condition for the lived body.
Today, if we like, we can read the dual sense of this ambiguous condi-
tion as it appears in Ricoeur’s later phenomenology of pre-given human 
10 For useful references to the influence Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty had on each 
other’s phenomenological writings, see Morris 129–34.
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capability that nevertheless struggles with misunderstandings of self and 
of others. In his last text, Ricoeur admits that the course of “recognition” 
for the capable subject encounters existential difficulties of identity, alter-
ity, differences, violence, inabilities undergone, failures of memory and 
endless conflict on the level of lived through experiences (The Course of 
Recognition 249–54). I see an opening in this text to take up the loss of 
confidence in the ability to understand oneself and be understood in terms 
of the gendered body.
Let us now return to the story of Eve who is configured as a figure of 
abjection. Appropriating Merleau-Ponty’s use of “flesh,” we can describe 
the pre-personal form of Eve’s incarnate capability constituting a “fleshy” 
intersubjective field of affection. Flesh connects bodies and world(s) inter-
subjectively. Moreover, at the same time as constituting an intersubjective 
field, this living body can be surprised by the upsurges of transcendence 
which “fly up like sparks from a fire” (Merleau-Ponty xv) setting off new, 
more personal discoveries in relation to the “lived through” world. Flesh 
constitutes a generality from which particularity emerges. Imagining how 
Merleau-Ponty would portray Eve, she would gradually emerge as the lived 
body and person (subject): but this is she who will be abjected. Describing 
her in Merleau-Ponty’s terms of “flesh” and “fleshy” is to a certain degree 
at least consistent with the biblical description of the first woman’s body. 
Yet the negative imagery of female flesh has been rejected by those philos-
ophers and feminists who think we have—and should have—left mythical 
stories and images behind once we have been educated by history, biology, 
genetics, etc. Nevertheless, descriptions of flesh, especially including the 
female body’s association with the nascent subject who is abjected, remain 
part of the ethical, social and spiritual imaginary of Western cultures.11 
Arguably the term “fleshiness” captures how Western philosophers 
still imagine and connect sexed bodies. In the (feminist) terms of Merleau-
Ponty’s contemporary and friend, Simone de Beauvoir, the female body 
becomes “the second sex” or even “the sex.” In the present context, our fo-
cus is the manner in which confidence (la confiance) and lost confidence, or 
mistrust (méfiance), of individually gendered bodies becomes a critical issue 
for contemporary feminist and non-feminist philosophers. For the sake of 
argument, confidence has been identified as a social phenomenon; and it is 
something that can be lost. It can also be elucidated, in phenomenological 
terms, at the point (in time) when the lived body intersects with the per-
sonal realm of that body-subject’s history and culture. In France, Merleau-
Ponty and de Beauvoir each offer highly significant descriptions of the 
11 I am grateful to Catherine Tomas for directing my attention to the concept of 
“enfleshment” as ideology inculcated in the body, as found in McLaren 66–70.
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 ambiguous condition of the lived body. They uncover the manner in which 
the pre-personal realm of (capable) flesh surges forth in sensual, spiritual 
and ethical life creating the possibility of intersubjective communication. 
In other words, this existential phenomenology makes manifest fleshiness 
as an original medium of communication enabling body-subjects to remain 
entangled in an intersubjective world.12 Thus, body-subjects become aware 
of themselves as vulnerable selves in their relations within the world.
Feminism has a crucial role to play in a phenomenology of lost con-
fidence and, in the present case, in the loss of a  self ’s ability to under-
stand herself. What makes loss a useful focus? First, a feminist critique of 
lost confidence in a woman’s own capability challenges an uncritical and 
non-reflexive stance on the self; and, second, this critical focus elucidates 
a capacity for understanding gender in a time of philosophical transition. 
Claims to gender-neutrality in Western philosophy conceal highly signifi-
cant issues of loss of confidence, loss of epistemic justice and loss of re-
flexive self-understanding. Loss not only damages subjects of knowledge 
and action, but this damage obscures that which was in phenomenologi-
cal terms originally given: capability. Admittedly, there are problems with 
phenomenological philosophy. However, phenomenological terms enable 
us to explore given conditions, and then, following Ricoeur, we can add 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is interpretation; and, in this context, the 
hermeneuticist interprets the opaque, in order to make the capacities of 
the subject more transparent. So, hermeneutics can help women and men 
to make sense of themselves, to understand their own cognitive and cona-
tive abilities, and to achieve greater self-awareness. The present appropria-
tion of Ricoeurian hermeneutic phenomenology aims to keep women and 
men critically open to the gendering of philosophy in cultural transition. 
All too roughly, philosophy as part of a changing European culture can 
help to articulate the material, social and cognitive dimensions of a sub-
ject’s conditioning. In particular, hermeneutical philosophers can seek to 
understand those dimensions of a subject that phenomenologists would 
describe as “non-natural.”
12 The critical question for a feminist philosopher is: in what sense does an individual 
body exist? It should be stressed that Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception 
elucidates the general pre-personal (motor) intentionality of which an individual body is 
not its own cause and for which it is not responsible. At the same time what is called 
a  pre-personal fleshiness remains inseparable from the body’s personal life. It is as if 
this phenomenology employs a transcendental argument to deduce the necessity of pre-
personal flesh for the possibility of any personal experience. It follows that the capable 
fleshy body exists as the necessary a  priori form for all of the modes of incarnate life; 
in turn, these modes are both attuned to a field of sensations and located within a larger 
situation of historical change and cultural variations. 
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GenderInG the subject: loss And chAnGe
Text matters for my Ricoeurian hermeneutic phenomenology of gendered 
confidence. In “The Lived Body, Gender and Confidence” I experiment 
with a phenomenological reading of a text about the awakening of a wom-
an to her cognitive and non-cognitive capacities. As already suggested, the 
exploration of the philosophical imagery in the texts written by French 
phenomenologists—like the philosophical imagery found in Merleau-Pon-
ty’s The Phenomenology of Perception or in Beauvoir’s The Second Sex—can 
help to elucidate the gendering of the lived body. Merleau-Ponty’s highly 
significant, even if contentious, conception of the lived body has been un-
derstood to be “a kind of ” post-Kantian a priori insofar as its flesh knits 
human bodies together and to a world (“The Lived Body” 163, 168). As 
a synthetic form capable of creating unity out of multiple sensations, the 
lived body appears to be capable of generating differentiations in its rela-
tion to the world. Yet what Merleau-Ponty portrays as the openness and 
the relational ties of a “fleshy” existence creates a deeply ambiguous pic-
ture: the body is located in a world it did not create and over which it does 
not have ultimate control. Given this awareness of the lived body in such 
a world, we are not surprised that the subject loses confidence in her own 
capability. 
Now, for a Ricoeurian phenomenological interpretation of the gen-
dered, but capable body, it is necessary to recognize that gender becomes 
a  factor in regulating the cognitive capacities of the body-subject as it 
emerges in a personal and social world of loss and discord. Such a loss 
is especially the case for the gendered subject who is inhibited by per-
sonally and socially debilitating configurations of her actions in (reli-
gious) myths. In turn, the doubt and loss which we have seen portrayed 
in the traditional patriarchal configurations of the myth about Eve bear 
a strong similarity to twentieth-century portraits of the young Beauvoir 
who desired philosophical knowledge, yet who in the end actually gives 
in to the philosophical superiority of “the philosopher,” Sartre (“The 
Lived Body” 176-77). In the past twenty years, feminist philosophers 
have been especially perplexed by the young Simone (as Beauvoir ap-
pears in her memoirs), who after a single disagreement with Sartre in the 
Luxembourg Gardens in 1929 Paris gives in to him from that moment 
forward. Why, when Beauvoir attempted to defend her own philosophi-
cal ideas for a pluralist morality, did she give up and accept defeat not 
only for those philosophical ideas on that day in 1929 (when she had just 
successfully passed her philosophy exams), but for the rest of her life? 
From that moment she never calls herself a philosopher (cf. Le Doeuff, 
Hipparchia’s Choice 136).
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Adding Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of a capable subject 
to Beauvoir’s existential phenomenology of “the second sex” enables us to 
interpret the bodily situation of a woman as originally capable, yet vulner-
able to gender norms. Insofar as a woman recognizes herself already born 
capable, alive with a capacity to increase actively the power to exist, she 
has the capacity to overcome at least that vulnerability which results from 
a profound, yet unnecessary loss of ethical confidence. Like the mythi-
cal figure, Eve, Beauvoir as the young woman seeking moral knowledge 
is awakened to the incarnate modalities of her existence, to her cognitive 
capacity for knowledge of her own body and of her own goodness; and yet 
Beauvoir’s self-doubt and what seems to be her gendering lead to a loss of 
self-confidence, in her own ability to understand self (and to think philo-
sophically). In the terms of hermeneutic phenomenology of the gendered 
subject, we could say that a woman’s fleshy incarnation appears timelessly 
destined to action that results in disabilities; and yet, the always capable 
subject still possesses the power to restore her ability to strive for greater 
self-understanding. 
The question is no longer: “why . . .” the loss of confidence? Instead it 
is: how can the subject grasp that her loss is not permanent? Intuitively the 
answer would seem to be that she cannot lose what is fundamentally and 
originally hers. A real and urgent problem emerges for the hermeneutic 
phenomenologist who tries to interpret the actual ambiguity surrounding 
the subject’s incarnation within a fleshy, bodily existence. Transcendence 
of this incarnation is strictly speaking impossible. The woman in that phe-
nomenological account of a fleshy existence becomes aware not of confi-
dence in her own capability, but of lost confidence. Extending this phe-
nomenology, with the help of Beauvoir’s 1949 text, it can be argued that 
what made a particular person “a woman” at a certain historical moment, 
and within a certain Western philosophical tradition, had also marked her 
out as “the second sex.” Moreover, the variations of gender distinguish 
her confidence as a relational phenomenon. The difficulty is that neither 
women nor men in phenomenology have employed the necessary herme-
neutical tools to adequately address gender relations. 
My proposal is that a  Ricoeurian hermeneutic phenomenology of 
the gendered, yet capable subject would address the interpersonal real-
ity of gender, transforming negative relations into something positive. 
This would require the balancing of confidence between subjects; that is, 
ethical confidence requires the appropriate degree of confidence—neither 
under- nor overconfidence—for each and every gendered subject. Today 
an interpersonal conception of reciprocally related levels of confidence 
for gendered subjects seems (to me) a necessary condition for self-under-
standing within our bodily and cognitive life. And this self-understanding 
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would be supported by a fundamentally human, cognitive-conative capa-
bility. 
An ethical account of reciprocally related degrees of confidence re-
quires recognition of, on the one hand, a fragile belief in being part of ma-
terial nature as an active, infinite power, in which each individual can come 
to understand both the power to act and the power to suffer, and, on the 
other hand, an ontological grounding of confidence in the infinite power of 
capable humans to affect and be affected productively. Together the ethics 
and the ontology of a capable subject could, according to Ricoeur, reverse 
personal doubt with belief, interpersonal dissymmetry with the practical 
goal of mutuality, and social-material deprivation with the regulative ideal 
of fullness of life. 
To illustrate the relation of a pre-given body-mind unity to the con-
fidence of a capable subject, one has to consider a practical issue: that of 
a cognitive disability. According to Ricoeur, “To believe oneself unable to 
speak is already to be linguistically disabled, to be excommunicated so to 
speak” (“Autonomy and Vulnerability” 76–77). Decisive damage can be 
done to the ability to speak when a subject loses belief in herself as a speak-
er. Linguistic disability might strike us as a strange example for unearthing 
how pre-given capability helps to restore confidence; yet it is meant to 
point to the relational and contextual nature of lost confidence. In “Au-
tonomy and Vulnerability” Ricoeur re-establishes the moral power of hu-
man capability, even though vulnerability renders autonomy fragile. The 
moral power of knowing that she is capable—as implied in she “ought” 
because she “can” speak—helps the subject to confront with confidence in 
a fragile belief in her autonomous capability. With this knowledge of both 
autonomy and vulnerability in the power of (her) language to communi-
cate, she can recognize that her lost confidence in, for example, speaking 
is not irreversible.
The critical issue here rests in the degree to which gendered subjects 
maintain an appropriate self-confidence in relation to each other and, in our 
example, as speaking subjects. In other words, the subject’s confidence in 
her own capability seems to be a variable of gender; and gender is both in-
tersectional and interrelational. Why does “he” have so much confidence? 
Why does “she” have so little? Gender’s relation to sexual identity, race, 
class, religion and so on affects who she is and how much confidence he 
has. The worst extreme is the point at which a subject’s loss of confidence 
in her own abilities is so great that she barely exists in her own right. The 
complication is that, whether in a lack or an excess of confidence, subjects 
reflect their gendering without any consistent lines of demarcation. 
To repeat, gendering does not have to occur only in terms of a  bi-
nary of sex. And similarly, feminine and masculine abilities are not simply 
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mapped onto the female and male sex, respectively. Moreover, gendering is 
not a fixed process which neither an individual nor a collective can control. 
On these grounds, it is my contention that the social and material mecha-
nisms controlling gender roles and relations can and must become the ob-
ject of philosophical debate, if we are to strive for hermeneutical justice. 
cAPAbIlIty: ethIcAl confIdence And IncreAsInG Power 
Ricoeur makes another bold, yet initially strange claim that “The confi-
dence I place in my power to act is part of this very power. To believe that 
I can is already to be capable” (“Autonomy and Vulnerability” 76). Un-
derstanding this claim requires returning to Ricoeur’s assumptions about 
self-reflexivity, but also to his later discussions of power (“Autonomy and 
Vulnerability” 77). The power as interactive moves subjects to strive ra-
tionally for life with and for others; but this is only if power can be en-
hanced relationally, not inhibited. An adequate understanding of the latter 
remains crucial to giving an account of confidence. Earlier in the present 
essay, confidence appeared as ethical and social; and it is a distinctive char-
acteristic of a capable body. A body’s loss of confidence can be understood 
in relation to historical and social structures which inhibit or prohibit her 
cognitive and conative activities. Constraints of both culture and nature 
become evident in gendering the lived body; that is, whether or not gender 
inhibits confidence makes a decisive difference to the capable subject. In 
my previous discussions of the lived body, gender’s intersection with vari-
ous mechanisms of oppression has had a critical role to play; gender on its 
own cannot make sense of whether or not a subject’s confidence is ethical. 
So, together the question of confidence and that of power guide us back 
to human capability. 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of human capability reflects 
the changes in twentieth-century European philosophy. His early reliance 
on French neo-Kantianism by way of his friend and colleague, Jean Na-
bert, was already signposted in Ricoeur’s account of reflexivity (“On In-
terpretation” 187–97). Later self-reflexivity informs his phenomenologi-
cal reading of both ethical confidence as a mutually empowering relation 
between subjects and power-in-common as a  human capability. Briefly, 
in Ricoeur’s terms, “the ‘I can’” reflects confidence and power. Coinci-
dently, feminist philosophers in the twentieth century moved their inter-
pretations of the subject of philosophy away from an exclusive Cartesian 
“I think.” Women in philosophy began to challenge a Cartesian separation 
of mind and body for privileging mind as masculine and body as feminine. 
In response, both men and women philosophers began to turn away from 
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Cartesian dualism; some feminist and non-feminist philosophers turned 
to Spinoza’s monism. 
Ricoeur himself reflects this Spinozist trend in his conception of hu-
man capability. In particular, Ricoeur’s appropriation of Spinoza’s conatus 
makes sense of capability as a conative power. And my interpretation of 
capability as both conative and cognitive depends upon understanding co-
natus as the human striving for complete understanding within the whole 
of nature (or life). Roughly, but importantly, “cognitive” in the context of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology describes the knowledge-element 
in a rational power to act; and “conative” describes the element of striving 
to understand life. Both the cognitive and the conative elements of human 
capability remain necessary for the Ricoeurian acting and suffering sub-
ject, in order for it to increase in activity in this life. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology uncovers a subject who is originally capable of increas-
ing simultaneously in knowledge and in joy. If lost, this capability can be 
restored through actively increasing the cognitive and conative powers of 
interacting subjects.
In brief, my reconstruction of a Ricoeurian cognitive-conative capa-
bility has aimed to capture at least two of the elemental powers of the 
human subject. Ricoeur derives these ideas of power from the Spinozist 
dimension of the French neo-Kantian reflexive philosophy in early twenti-
eth-century France. These ideas are most frequently associated by Ricoeur 
himself with the influence of Nabert, whose philosophy in the 1940s made 
a profound and lasting impact on Ricoeur (“On Interpretation” 188). 
Ricoeur’s Spinozism more than his Kantianism might attract contem-
porary gender theorists and feminist ethicists. An additional attraction in 
the later Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of the capable subject is 
the power in compassion. This moves us to a just distance in friendship; 
that is, an increase in power becomes apparent in highly distinctive forms 
of love and respect. Here friendship implies a certain type of love (philia) 
for the sake of a mutually good life. In his last writings, Ricoeur describes 
a mutual sharing, or an accompanying one another, in life together. He 
illustrates this compassionate gaze in the extreme experience of dying, or 
of accompanying the dying, in “living up to death.” This means that “the 
dying person [is] still living, [insofar as] calling on the deepest resources 
of life” (Ricoeur, Living up to Death 14).
Yet it is important to note that Ricoeurian compassion is meant to be 
a responsible human practice, as such there is no fusion with the person 
dying, or the person attending to the dying. Instead an active passion re-
tains the possibility of moving—with appropriate confidence and increas-
ing cognitive-conative power—towards what Spinoza calls an intellectual 
love of the whole; that is, an infinite power of nature, in which we each 
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play active parts. As long as each of us is increasing in power, each increases 
in knowledge of nature’s dynamic activities.
Ricoeur insists that compassion is like friendship. But here he also 
seems to have in mind an Aristotelian activity for the sake of the good; 
this activity is a becoming in the incomplete actualization of a power. The 
activity of playing parts in the dynamic of nature, then, constitutes a con-
tinuously active, positively powerful life. In this way, we have the capabil-
ity to become confident in “living up to death,” that is, we are confident 
in what we are capable of, including goodness and mutually empowering 
activity right to the end of each singular life. Crucially, there can be posi-
tive power in the activities that make up friendship, compassion and in-
creasing knowledge; such activity increases the infinite relational powers 
of autonomous, yet vulnerable subjects.
It is important to note here that for Ricoeur compassion means attend-
ing to a dying person without fusion. And yet we can still uphold Spinoza’s 
idea of free emotion whereby a person both loves herself and participates 
in the infinite intellectual love of life as essential to a self-sustaining love, 
even in the movements of living-dying. Ironically, this brings us to a fairly 
Kantian point. While Spinoza conceives the role of power in transforming 
inactive passions into active ones, Kant recognizes the role of respect in 
maintaining the right distance between subjects. Ricoeur adds the distinc-
tive characteristic of treating oneself as other in the active and responsible 
practice of compassion. In the spirit of French reflexive philosophy, “the dif-
ficult art of existence is distilled not only in (and thanks to) the love of one’s 
neighbour as oneself but also in loving oneself as another” (Jervolino 536; 
cf. Anderson, “From Ricoeur to Life” 21–29). This mutual love encourages 
ethical confidence and so, the increasing ability to understand ourselves.
conclusIon: the ePIstemIc lImIt of self-confIdence
To sum up, my own work on “the subject’s loss of self-confidence in her 
own ability to understand herself ” began in the 1980s with study of Kant 
and Ricoeur. An awareness of gendering was beginning to take place, but 
the awareness of what gendering has done, or could do, to the subject’s 
confidence was not immediately apparent. Nevertheless, I  have tried to 
demonstrate here that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology can be used 
to elucidate how philosophical cultures shape the process not only of gen-
dering, but of giving an account of the identity of human subjects; the 
challenge is to uncover how gendering as a hidden process in determining 
human identity intersects with other material and social mechanisms as 
well as cognitive disabilities and human vulnerabilities. 
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We will not have arrived at any consensus on the subject’s gender iden-
tity, or, in Butler’s words, “of giving an account of oneself.” Yet we have 
hopefully understood that the process of gendering is highly complex, es-
pecially in cultures in rapid transition. This is precisely because life exceeds 
any account we could ever give of ourselves. In Butler’s highly significant 
words,
If the identity we say we are cannot possibly capture us and marks 
immediately an excess and opacity that falls outside the categories of 
identity, then any effort “to give an account of oneself ” will have to 
fail in order to approach being true. As we ask to know the other, or 
ask that the other say, finally or definitively, who he or she is, it will be 
important not to expect an answer that will ever satisfy. By not pursu-
ing satisfaction and by letting the question remain open, even enduring, 
we let the other live, since life might be understood as precisely that 
which exceeds any account we may try to give of it. If letting the other 
live is part of any ethical definition of recognition, then this version of 
recognition will be based less on knowledge than on an apprehension of 
epistemic limits. (Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself 42–43, also 34; 
cf. Cavarero 92)
Although not a self-confessed Kantian, Butler articulates extremely well 
the epistemic limit of any phenomenological attempt to give an account 
of oneself. But this limit is not a  reason for despair or inertia. Instead, 
within epistemic limits each of us can recognize the significance of both 
confidence in our cognitive-conative capability and power in increasingly 
understanding one another. No matter what the limit to our self-knowl-
edge, together the ethical confidence and the interactive power of capable 
subjects could still animate the life of each and every self. 
To conclude, let us return to Kristeva’s reading of Antigone. As I have 
already proposed, Kristeva’s re-configuration of Antigone serves in re-vi-
sioning gender for women today. In “Antigone: Limit and Horizon” Kris-
teva herself clearly follows after Kant in giving a central role to “limit.” She 
asserts that 
a growing number of women confront the limit states of human ex-
perience with the indestructible serenity of Antigone. And who reveal 
themselves as a horizon—for better and for worse. A horizon at which 
the laws themselves, because this all takes place in the social order, are 
susceptible of being transformed; but this transformation takes place 
first in the depth of the psyche, before being consecrated, eventually, by 
political justice. (227)
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I cannot help, but interpret this “indestructible serenity” as an image of 
woman’s capability: and so, she becomes confident in striving for self-un-
derstanding. Moreover, in living the intensity of this human striving to be 
the confident, self-reflexive subject of a Ricoeurian-inspired hermeneutic 
phenomenology, we endeavour not only to understand life for and with 
other subjects, but to live the life of subjects whose ethical confidence 
maintains the right negotiation of gender in interpersonal relations. So, 
despite the epistemic limit, a  Ricoeurian hermeneutic phenomenologist 
might agree with the gender theorist’s (Butler’s) conclusion that the cru-
cial message is to let ourselves and others live!
  works cIted
Anderson, Pamela Sue. “Abjection and Defilement: A Pre-linguistic Con-
dition for Reading Ricoeur on Sexual Identity.” At the Boundaries of 
Thought: Paul Ricoeur and the Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Adam Graves. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, forthcoming. Print.
---. “From Ricoeur to Life: ‘Living Up to Death’ with Spinoza, but also 
with Deleuze.” From Ricoeur to Action: the Socio-Political Significance 
of Ricoeur’s Thinking. Ed. Todd S. Mei and David Lewin. London: 
Continuum, 2012. 19–32. Print.
---. “The Lived Body, Gender and Confidence.” New Topics in Feminist 
Philosophy of Religion: Contestations and Transcendence Incarnate. Ed. 
Pamela Sue Anderson. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010. 163–80. Print.
---. “Re-reading Myth in Philosophy: Hegel, Ricoeur and Irigaray reading 
Antigone.” Paul Ricoeur and Narrative: Context and Contestation. Ed. 
Morny Joy. Calgary: U of Calgary P, 1997. 51–68. Print.
---. Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: Reason, Love and Epis-
temic Locatedness. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012. Print.
---. Ricoeur and Kant. Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1993. Print.
---. “The Subject’s Loss of Self-Confidence in its own Ability to Under-
stand Itself.” Life and Philosophy: Essays to Honour Alan Montefiore. 
Ed. Catherine Audard-Montefiore, Nicholas Bunnin, Paul Flather, 
Maurice Fraser, and Steven Lewis. Oxford: FEP, 2011. 87–93. Print.
Beauvoir, Simone de. The Second Sex. Trans. Constance Borde and Sheila 
Malovany-Chevalier. London: Cape, 2009. Print.
Butler, Judith. Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death. New 
York: Columbia UP, 2000. Print.
---. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005. Print.
52
Pamela Sue Anderson
---. “Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description.” The Thinking 
Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy. Ed. J. Allen and Iris 
Marion Young. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1989. 85–100. Print.
Cavarero, Adriana. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. Trans. 
Paul A. Kottman. London: Routledge, 2000. Print.
Clément, Catherine, and Julia Kristeva. The Feminine and the Sacred. Trans. 
Jane Marie Todd. New York: Columbia UP; Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave, 2001. Print.
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. On Intersectionality: The Essential Writings of Kim-
berlé Crenshaw. New York: New, 2012. Print.
Hersch, Jeanne. “Eve ou la Naissance éternelle du Temps”. Textes. Fri-
bourg: le Feu de Nuict, 1985. 27. Print.
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Ox-
ford UP, 1977. Print.
Howie, Gillian. Between Feminism and Materialism: A Question of Method. 
New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010. Print.
Jervolino, Domenico. “The Depth and Breadth of Paul Ricoeur’s Philoso-
phy.” The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn. Chi-
cago: Open Court, 1995. 533–43. Print. 
Kristeva, Julia. “Antigone: Limit and Horizon.” Feminist Readings of Anti-
gone. Ed. Fanny Soderbäck. Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 2010. 
215–29. Print.
Le Doeuff, Michèle. Hipparchia’s Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Phi-
losophy, etc. Trans. Trista Selous. New York: Columbia UP, 2007. Print.
---. The Sex of Knowing. Trans. Kathryn Hamer and Lorraine Code. Lon-
don: Routledge, 2003. Print.
McLaren, Peter. Critical Pedagogy and Predatory Culture: Oppositional Pol-
itics in a Postmodern Era. London: Routledge, 1995. Print.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. C. Smith. 
London: Routledge Classics, 2002. Print.
Montefiore, Alan. Introduction. Philosophy in France Today. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1983. vii–xxvi. Print.
Morris, Katherine J. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum, 
2012. Print.
Ricoeur, Paul. “Autonomy and Vulnerability.” Reflections on the Just. Trans. 
David Pellauer. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007. 72–90. Print.
---. The Course of Recognition. Trans. David Pellauer. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 2005. Print.
---. Living up to Death. Trans. David Pellauer. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
2009. Print.
---. Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
1992. Print.
---. “On Interpretation.” Philosophy in France Today. Ed. Alan Montefiore. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983. 175–97. Print.
